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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MELVIN SCOTT BECKSTEAD, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20020422-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp. 2002). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996 & Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Is it reasonable to infer that defendant possessed the methamphetamine found in 
his urine where defendant admitted to possessing marijuana metabolite also found in his 
urine, failed sobriety tests, and offered no innocent explanation for the methamphetamine 
in his urine at trial? 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a bench verdict, this Court 
"must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if [the Court] otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
has been made." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, f 10, 1999 P.2d 1252 (quotation 
omitted). The conviction must be supported by "a quantum of evidence concerning each 
element of the crime as charged from which the [factfinder] may base its conclusion of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt/' Id. Any legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
It is unlawfulf] for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, 
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, 
or as otherwise authorized by this subsectionf.] 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp. 2002). 
4
 Possession' or 'use' means the joint or individual ownership, control, 
occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, 
inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from 
distribution of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group 
possession or use of controlled substances. For a person to be a possessor 
or user of a controlled substance, it is not required that he be shown to have 
individually possessed, use, or controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if 
it is shown that the person jointly participated with one or more persons in 
the use, possession, or control of any substances with knowledge that the 
activity was occurring, or the controlled substance is found in a place or 
under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and the intent 
to exercise dominion and control over it. 
UTAHCODEANN. § 58-37-2(dd)(1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE FACTS 
Charge. Defendant was charged with two third degree felonies for possession of 
methamphetamine and amphetamine, and with a class B misdemeanor for possession of 
marijuana (R8-9). Defendant pled guilty to the misdemeanor marijuana charge in justice 
2 
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court and the amphetamine charge was dismissed (R16-17), Defendant was bound over 
on the felony methamphetamine charge (id.). 
Bench Trial. A bench trial was held on 5 December 2001 (R41-42). The 
prosecution submitted the search warrant affidavit for defendant's bodily fluids and 
proffered that Deputy Dudley's testimony would be consistent with the affidavit 
(T2:6,10) (see Exh. #1). The affidavit provided as follows: 
On 1-26-01 at about 1700 hours [defendant] came to jail on a court 
ordered commitment for contempt of court out of justice court. 
[Defendant] was taken into the jail by me, Deputy Wes Dudley, a 
jailer at the Sevier County Jail. Upon entering the jail, as I was talking with 
[defendant], I could smell the odor of marijuana on or about the person of 
[defendant]. I looked at the pupils in [defendant's] eyes and felt they were 
dilated, which is an indication of marijuana use. I also asked [defendant] if 
he had been using any dope. He said no. [Defendant] became agitated at 
the question and tried to change the subject. I then contacted my sergeant, 
Alan Pearson, who in turn contacted Det. Dwight Jenkins of the task force. 
He asked Det. Jenkins if he could come to jail (sic) to see if [defendant] was 
under the influence of a controlled substance. This is important for the 
safety of [defendant] as well as other inmates and deputies who work in the 
jail to determine if [defendant] is under the influence of a controlled 
substance. 
Det. Jenkins came to the jail at about 1800 hours to check [defendant]. 
[Defendant] was given a series of tests including nystagmus, one leg stand, heel to 
toe and internal clock. Also checked were his pupils. [Defendant] had lack of 
convergence on the nystagmus test and lack of smooth pursuit. He also failed the 
one leg stand and the heel to toe. In addition, his internal clock was slow and the 
pupils in his eyes were dilated. All of these are indications of use of a controlled 
substance. He became very defensive when Det. Jenkins asked if he had used any 
marijuana or other drugs lately. He again tried to change the subject talking about 
other things and avoiding the questions about drugs. 
(Exh. #1) (a copy is contained in add. A). 
3 
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The parties stipulated to the admission of a toxicology report indicating the 
presence of marijuana metabolite and methamphetamine in defendant's urine (T2:9-10) 
{see Exh. #2) (a copy is contained in add. B). 
Defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant had previously pled guilty 
to the possession of marijuana charge: "It (toxicology report) also shows marijuana 
metabolite was in there. Well we're not contending with that. [Defendant] pled guilty to 
that offense in Justice Court shortly after, ah, these events arose" (T2:7). 
Having adduced the above evidence, the parties argued its sufficiency to support a 
conviction of methamphetamine possession (T2:10-31). The prosecutor argued that 
defendant's possession of the methamphetamine was "substantiated by the fact that he 
acknowledged the voluntary use of the marijuana when he entered his plea in the Justice 
Court" (T2:22). In response, defense counsel n^imized his earlier acknowledgment that 
defendant pled guilty to the marijuana charge: "an admission by the defendant to 
knowingly and voluntarily possessing marijuana wasn't made in this case and I suspect, 
i 
ah, there wasn't anything made in the Justice Court either, ah, because it's not a court of 
record and it would be unusual for, ah - for a Justice of the Peace to dwell on a factual 
basis for a pleaQ (see T2:27-28). The trial court took the matter under advisement 1 
(T2:31-32). 
Order. On 20 March 2002, the trial court issued an order refusing to dismiss the 
methamphetamine charge and finding that defendant's possession of methamphetamine 
• 4 . , 
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was substantiated by his "efforts to evade questions about use of drugs" (R48-50) (a copy 
is contained in add. C). 
Motion to Arrest Judgment Denied. Defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment 
on 23 April 2002, prior to sentencing (R69, 58-63). Defendant challenged the trial 
court's ruling that his knowing and intentional possession of the methamphetamine was 
buttressed by his agitation and attempts to change the subject when asked about his drug 
use (R61-63). The trial court summarily denied the motion (R75) (a copy is contained in 
add.E). 
Sentence. The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 0-5 
years in the Utah State Prison (R72-73). The trial court then suspended defendant's 
prison term and placed him on 18 months probation, which included 30-days in the 
county jail (id.). 
Appeal. Defendant's appeal is timely (R78). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It is undisputed that a toxicology report revealed methamphetamine and marijuana 
metabolite in defendant's urine. Given the additional corroborating facts that defendant 
admitted to possessing marijuana injustice court and failed sobriety tests at the county 
jail, it is reasonable to infer that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the 
methamphetamine in his urine as well. This is particularly true in the absence of any 
innocent explanation for the methamphetamine in his urine at trial. 
5 
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ARGUMENT 
IT IS REASONABLE TO INFER THAT DEFENDANT POSSESSED 
METHAMPHETAMINE FOUND IN HIS URINE WHERE 
DEFENDANT ADMITTED TO POSSESSING MARIJUANA 
METABOLITE ALSO FOUND IN HIS URINE, FAILED SOBRIETY 
TESTS AND OFFERED NO INNOCENT EXPLANATION FOR THE 
METHAMPHETAMINE IN HIS URINE AT TRIAL 
Defendant asserts that the toxicology report revealing the presence of 
methamphetamine and marijuana metabolite in his urine is insufficient to support his 
conviction for possession of methamphetamine. Aplt Br. at 5-10. Defendant cites the 
majority rule that, absent some corroborating proof of knowledge and intent, a positive 
drug test alone does not prove a defendant's knowing and intentional possession of drugs 
revealed in bodily fluids. Aplt Br. at 5 (citing cases). Here, defendant's obvious 
impairment at the county jail, his admission to possessing the marijuana metabolite 
constitutes corroborating proof that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the 
methamphetamine as well. Defendant's insufficiency claim thus fails. 
Elements of Methamphetamine Possession. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (1998 
& Supp. 2001), proscribes any knowing and intentional possession or use of controlled 
substances, unless the substance was obtained 'Hinder a valid prescription or order, 
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice^]" 
"'Possession' or 'use' means the . . . control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, 
maintaining, or the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption . . . of 
controlled substances." UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-2(dd) (1998). 
6 
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Proceedings Below. In lieu of testimonial evidence, the parties stipulated to the 
admission of a toxicology report revealing the presence of marijuana metabolite and 
methamphetamine in defendant's urine (T2:5-7) (see Exh. # 2), add. B. Additionally, the 
parties stipulated that Deputy Dudley's testimony, if called, would be consistent with the 
search warrant affidavit for defendant's bodily fluids (id.) (See Exh. # 1), add. A. 
According to the affidavit, defendant reported to the Sevier County Jail to serve an 
unrelated term smelling of marijuana and exhibiting other characteristics of drug 
impairment (Exh. # 1), Add. A. Defendant failed field sobriety tests and tried to change 
the subject when officers asked whether he was using marijuana or any other drug (id.). 
Although he later attempted to minimize its significance, defense counsel 
acknowledged that defendant pled guilty in justice court to possessing marijuana 
and therefore was "not contending with that" (T2:7,27). A guilty plea to possessing 
marijuana necessarily constituted an admission that he knowingly and intentionally 
possessed that drug. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp. 2002). See 
also State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266,1273 (Utah 1988) (recognizing that 4"a guilty plea 
is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge'" (quoting McCarthy v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 459,466 (1969)). 
The trial court determined defendant was guilty of methamphetamine possession 
on the grounds that "finding both methamphetamine and marijuana metabolite in the 
Defendant's system, coupled with the Defendant's efforts to evade questions about use of 
drugs, [was] sufficient to conclude that the use was voluntary"(R50). 
7 :' 
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The Majority Rule. The majority of jurisdictions to consider this issue have 
concluded that a positive drug test alone does not prove a defendant's knowing and 
intentional possession of a controlled substance in bodily fluid. See, e.g., State v. McCoy, 
864 P.2d 307, 311 (N.M. App. 1993), reversed on other grounds, 882 P.2d 1 (N.M. 
1994); State v. Benton, 884 P.2d 505, 505 (N.M. App. 1994); City of Logan v. Cox, 624 
N.E.2d 751, 754 (Ohio App. 1993); Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 608 N.E.2d 717, 721 
n.7(Mass. 1993). Those jurisdictions reason that once a controlled substance enters the 
body, the ability to exercise dominion and control over its consequent effect is lost. Id. 
Utah's appellate courts have not directly confronted this issue, although this Court cited 
the majority rule with approval in State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466,467 n.2 (Utah App. 
1988). 
While the bench verdict here focuses primarily on the toxicology report indicating 
the presence of marijuana metabolite and methamphetamine in defendant's urine, the 
prosecution presented "some corroborating evidence" that defendant's possession of both 
the drugs in his urine was knowing and intentional. McCoy, 864 P.2d at 312. First, 
defendant failed field sobriety tests administered at the county jail (Exh. # 1), add. A. 
Second, defendant admitted to possessing marijuana injustice court (T2:7). See State v. 
Hall, 409 S.E.2d 221 (Ga. App. 1991) (upholding methamphetamine possession 
conviction based on blood test result because there was additional evidence to support the 
charge including accident scene, high level of alcohol also present in defendant's system, 
8 
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and defendant's behavior and demeanor), reversed on other grounds, Curtis v. State, 2002 
WL 31298857, S.E.2d (Ga.2002).1 
Given the above, and absent any innocent explanation for the toxicology results at 
trial, it is reasonable to infer that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the 
methamphetamine discovered along with the marijuana metabolite in his urine {see Exh. # 
2), add. B. Ordinarily, one does not "accidentally" get meth in bodily fluids. Rather, the 
more likely and reasonable explanation is that it was purposefully ingested. That 
reasonable inference is supported, in this case, by the fact that defendant admitted that he 
intentionally ingested another illegal substance, marijuana. That admission shows a 
willingness to use illegal substances, thereby suggesting that the meth was not "slipped" 
lThe trial court also relied on defendant's agitation and avoidance of questioning 
about his suspected drug use at the county jail (R50), add. C. On appeal, defendant 
contends that this evidence constitutes inadmissible post-arrest silence. Aplt. Br. at 13. 
The record does not support defendant's conclusory suggestion that he was arrested for 
the marijuana charge prior to this questioning {see Exh. A). Nor is it clear that defendant 
was otherwise in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 
before police asked about his apparent recent drug use—defendant's cursory brief does 
not analyze this issue. Aplt. Br. at 13-14. While the record sheds little light on the 
"language used to summon" defendant to the county jail, or on the "physical surroundings 
of the interrogation," and whether "additional pressure was exerted to detain" defendant, 
it does appear defendant was confronted with evidence of his guilt. See, e.g., State v. 
Swink, 2000 UT App 262, f 11,11 P.3d 299 (setting forth relevant considerations for 
evaluating applicability of Miranda warnings to an inmate). While not conceding 
custody, the State recognizes that the question is a close one and for that reason does not 
rely heavily on defendant's response to the drug related questioning to support its 
sufficiency claim here. See Swink, 2000 UT App 262, ^  f 11-13 (holding that Swink's 
intake interview did not amount to custodial interrogation where Swink was interviewed 
by a youth counselor as opposed to a police officer and was not confronted with evidence 
of his culpability in the vehicle theft, which theft authorities were unaware of until Swink 
himself revealed it during the interview). 
9 
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to defendant, but was voluntarily ingested. Thus, absent some innocent explanation the 
trial court reasonably inferred from the presence of methamphetamine in defendant's 
urine, that he intentionally and knowingly possessed and used that substance. 
As noted by the trial court, a similar inference is permitted in receiving stolen 
property cases. Indeed, this Court upheld a jury instruction providing that "[possession 
of property recently stolen, if not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance 
from which you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in light of the surrounding 
circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that the person in possession of the 
stolen property stole the property and knew that it was stolen." State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1, 
5 (Utah App. 1996) (emphasis in original), cert, denied, 934 P.2d 652 (Utah 1997). See 
also State v. Williams, 111 P.2d 220 (1985) (upholding forgery conviction where 
"[defendant presented no evidence to controvert the logical inferences which could be { 
drawn by the jury, i.e., that without any explanation as to where he got the check or from 
whom, the defendant knew the check was forged"); State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, 
988 P.2d 949 ("Under current Utah law, a person who merely utters a forged instrument 
can be inferred to have had knowledge of the forgery") (citing Williams, 111 P.2d at 223). 
Such an inference is arguably more compelling in a drug possession case than in a 
receiving stolen property case, because methamphetamine is an inherently illicit 
substance that ordinarily is ingested voluntarily. In other words, unlike controlled \ 
substances found in one's system, there is nothing about the physical characteristics of a 
\-
10 
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television set or other property that would necessarily suggest to the possessor that it was 
stolen. 
Moreover, given the compelling nature of the toxicology report and the 
corroborating facts that defendant flunked sobriety tests at the jail and admitted to 
possessing the marijuana metabolite in his urine, there is at least as much evidence of 
possession here as in Provo City v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437,443 (Utah App. 1993). This 
Court affirmed Sport's conviction for marijuana possession in the absence of my 
"chemical test data," noting that under such a circumstance, evidence of the substance's 
smell, together with observations of Spotts taking "hits" from a "joint," his physical 
characteristics of impairment, and his inculpatory statements "approachefd] the outer 
limit of what [the Court] would affirm for a possession case." Id 
Jurisdiction. The above evidence not only establishes beyond a reasonable doubt 
that defendant possessed the methamphetamine in his urine, but also the trial court's 
jurisdictional finding (R46). As recognized in Sorenson, the non-element of jurisdiction 
need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, 758 P.2d at 470. 
While the prosecutor conceded that it is not known where defendant ingested the 
methamphetamine (T2:30), such evidence is not critical to the State's possession theory. 
As set forth above, evidence of controlled or illicit substances in one's bodily fluids is 
evidence of possession, which in this case is buttressed by defendant's admission that he 
intentionally possessed the marijuana metabolite found alongside the meth in his urine. 
See, e.g., Section 58-37-2(dd) ("'Possession' or 'use' means the . . . control, occupancy, 
11 
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holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, inhalation, swallowing, 
injection, or consumption . . . of controlled substances."). Accordingly, more important 
than the locale of ingestion is evidence that defendant exhibited signs of impairment in 
the county jail and admitted to possessing the marijuana metabolite injustice court 
(T2:7). It is reasonable to infer from these facts that, just as he possessed the marijuana 
metabolite in his urine in Sevier County, defendant possessed the methamphetamine 
found alongside the marijuana metabolite in his urine in Sevier County. 
The State's possession theory in this case is distinguishable from the result in 
Sorenson, where the State proceeded on a consumption theory under a different statute 
prohibiting alcohol possession by a minor. 758 P.2d at 467. Because the State failed to 
put on evidence that Sorenson consumed the alcohol within Utah, there was insufficient 
evidence to establish jurisdiction. Id. at 470. Here, on the other hand, in retaining the 
meth in his urine in Sevier County, defendant committed the offense of possession "either 
wholly or partly within the state" and that is sufficient to establish jurisdiction. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-1-201 (l)-(2) (1999) ("A person is subject to jurisdiction in this state" if 
"the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the state[.]... An offense is 
committed partly within this state if either the conduct which is any element of the i 
offense, or the result which is such an element, occurs within this state itself"). 
12 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, defendant's conviction for possession of methamphetamine 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on ^ December 2002. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
IAN DE( 
'Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on 3_ December 2002,1 mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee, postage prepaid, to the following: 
MARCUS TAYLOR 
175 North Main Street 
P.O. Box 728 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Attorney for Appellee 
fefrffia 
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01/26/01 FRI 19:50 FAX SEVIER COUNTY JAIL 2002 
IN THB ^Hsble± COURT, COUNTY OP ScJlcf 
STATB OP UTAH 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
aa. 
COUNTY OP &C*>IAT ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR 8BARCR WARRANT 
BBFORE THB HONORABLB JUDOB A^QcJer 
The undersigned, baing first duly sworn, daposaa and says: 
Tha affiant has reason.to believe that PjWrtn ^nft ftgekdton/ 
has controllad substaneaa in hia/har body, and that aald 
:rollad substaneaa wara unlawfull" »«*».4—~• -w»w«« Bui«i.«ii6w in nxa/nar body* and that eaid 
controllad substaneaa wara unlawfully acquired, ara unlawfully 
poaaaaaad, and constitutas avidanoa of illegal conduct. 
Tha facta to eatabliah tha grounds for iasuanca of a Saarch Warrant, ara: 
SBB ATTACHBD — 
Tha Affiant furthar raquasts that permission ba given to 
obtain tha bodily fluids either in tha daytiae or in tha 
nighttime, because controllad aubstancaa ara absorbed by tha body 
and a failure to obtain tha bodily fluids as soon aa poaaible 
will lead to tha dissipation of avidanoa. 
WHBRBFORB, tha affiant prays that a eeareh warrant ba issued 
for tha saisura of bodily fluids fro*. f ^ W m <g^ FtrMPttJ 
who is preaantly located at :W.« r b~^ rr^T T 
\2mi. ,-» ) ,/. 
, SUB8CKIBID AND 8WC 
> - ^ ( ^ _ 
jttaxxa^' *9c«ufj ui ucan 
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oi/<;o/ui KKl 19:50 FAX SEVIER COUNTY JAIL 2)003 
AFFIDAVIT- GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A BODY 
FLUIDS SEARCH WARRANT 
ON 1-26-01 AT ABOUT 1700 HOURS MELVIN SCOTT BECKSTEAD CAME TO 
JAIL ON A COURT ORDERED COMMITMENT FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT OUT OF 
JUSTICE COURT. 
MR. BECKSTEAD WAS TAKEN INTO THE JAIL BY ME, DEPUTY WES 
DUDLEY, A JAILER AT THE SEVIER COUNTY JAIL. UPON ENTERING THE 
JAIL, AS I WAS TALKING WITH MR. BECKSTEAD, I COULD SMELL THE ODOR 
OF MARIJUANA ON OR ABOUT THE PERSON OF MBLVIN SCOTT BECKSTEAD. I 
LOOKED AT THE PUPILS IN MR. BBCKSTEADS EYES AND FELT THEY WERE 
DIALATED, WHICH IS AN INDICATION OF MARIJUANA USB. I ALSO ASKED 
MR. BECKSTEAD IF HE HAD BEEN USING ANY DOPE. HE SAID NO. MR. 
BECKSTEAD BECAME AGGITATED AT THE QUESTION AND TRIED TO CHANGE THE 
SUBJECT. I THEN CONTACTED MY SERGEANT, ALAN PEARSON WHO IN TURN 
CONTACTED DET. DWIGHT JENKINS OF THE TASK FORCE. HE ASKED DET. 
JENKINS IF HE COULD COMB TO JAIL TO SEB IF MR. BECKSTEAD WAS UNDER 
THE INFLUENCE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. THIS IS IMPORTANT FOR THE 
SAFETY OF INMATE MELVIN BECKSTEAD AS WELL AS OTHER INMATES AND 
DEPUTIES WHO WORK IN THB JAIL TO DBTBRMINB IF MR. BECKSTEAD IS 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
DET. JENKINS CAME TO THB JAIL AT ABOUT 1800 HOURS TO CHECK 
MELVIN SCOTT BECKSTEAD. MR. BECKSTEAD WAS GIVEN A SERIES OF TESTS 
INCLUDING NYSTAGMAS, ONE LEG STAND, HEEL TO TOB AND INTERNAL CLOCK. 
ALSO CHECKED WERB HIS PUPILS. MR. BECKSTEAD HAD LACK OF 
CONVERGENCE ON THE NYSTAGMUS TEST AND LACK OF SMOOTH PURSUIT. HE 
ALSO FAILED THE ONB LEO STAND AND THE HEEL TO TOB. IN ADDITION HIS 
INTERNAL CLOCK WAS SLOW AND THB PUPILS IN HIS EYES WERE DIALATED. 
ALL OF THESE ARE INDICATIONS OF USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
HE BECAME VERY DEFENSIVE WHBN DET. JENKINS ASKED IF HE HAD USED ANY 
MARIJUANA OR OTHER DRUGS LATELY. HE AGAIN TRIED TO CHANGE THE 
SUBJECT TALKING ABOUT OTHER THINGS AND. AVOIDING THB QUESTIONS ABOUT 
DRUGS. 
FOR THE SAFETY OF ALL CONCERNED WE PRAY A SEARCH WARRANT BE 
ISSUED FOR BODY FLUIDS FROM MBLVIN SCOTT BECKSTEAD. 
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0 1 2 6 0 1 FRI 1 3 : 5 0 FAX SEVIER COl'NTY JAIL 
2ooi 
IN THE ifr*W«irit.4- COURT 
COUNTY OP <^Atr , STATE OP UTAH 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
33 
COUNTY OP <*u\*s ) 
SEARCH WARRANT 
To any Peace Officer in the State of Utah: 
Proof by affidavit under oath having bein made ^ hie day 
before me by L^U^ JV-IU^V * I *<* eatiefied that there is , 
probable cauae to believe that on the pereon of flL*iu\* *,*& 9**.c)iVie°a 
presently located at 4c<s\mr f ^ A ^ .W%\ 
County of <±ui*r . State of Utah, there are controlled substances 
which are contained in hie/her body fluids, which were unlawfully 
acquired or are unlawfully possessed. 
YOU ARB THEREFORE COMMANDED: in the day or night time to 
obtain a body fluid sample from t&f\u\* 5fo«ft <&*&**W*l . 
Given under my hand and 
wvuiiwj wi. . Ttuierr , btace ot Utaft 
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Gev«m«c DEPARTMENT OF HEALi H 
DIVISION OF EPIDEMIOLOGY & LABORATORY SERVICES 
PUBLIC SAFETY TOXICOLOGY SECTION 
4* NORTH MEDICAL DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84U3-U0S 
(*H)St4-*400 
(Wl)5*4-*50!-Fn 
TOXICOLOGY REPORT 
AGENCY: SEVIER COUNTY SHERIPP 
SUSPECT: BBCKSTBAD, MBLVIN SCOTT 
0 9 / 2 7 / 1 9 8 2 
UT162997581 
LABORATORY NO: L2001-043S 
AGENCY CASE NO: 1001181 
OFFICER: WESLEY DUDLEY 
LABORATORY FINDINGS 
Amphetamine and methamphetamine were confirmed positive in the urine by GC/MS. 
Urine marijuana metabolite was confirmed positive by GC/MS at a level above 
75 nanograms per milliliter. 
Analysed by Susan A. Raemusaen 
URINB COCADH: Hone Detected 
jUx»A. \\^( <XKw\Knjw~ 
Sworn and subscribed to before me this 1 4 day of M a r c h 2001 
Notary Public Signature 
fTATrsEXHterr 
^ 
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Addendum C 
ArlH^nHum C* 
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R. Don Brown #0464 
Sevier County Attorney 
Sevier County Justice Complex 
835 East 300 North, Suite 100 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: (435) 896-2675 
IN THB DISTRICT COURT OP THB SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
O R D E R 
vs. : 
MELVIN SCOTT BBCXSTKAD, : 
DOB: 09/27/82 Case No. 011600086FS 
Defendant. Judge David L. Mower 
The Court, having considered the Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss in conjunctioa with the taking of testimony at a bench trial 
on the 5th day of December, 2001, and having taken the matter under 
advisement and being fully advised, now enters the following: 
rapawi or FACT 
1. On January 26, 2001, the Defendant, pursuant to a 
commitment issued by the Sevier County Justice Court, reported to the 
Sevier County Jail to commence service of a jail sentence. 
2. That the intake officer, Deputy Wesley Dudley, could 
smell the odor of burnt marijuana on the Defendant's person and made 
observations with regard to the Defendant's eyes which indicated 
possible impairment from the use of marijuana. 
CLERK Qa 
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State of Utah vs. Melvin Scott Beckstead 
3. Deputy Dudley inquired as to whether the Defendant had 
been using marijuana. 
4. The Defendant became agitated, tried to change the 
subject and did not answer. 
5. Deputy Dudley requested the assistance of Deputy Dwight 
Jenkins, an officer with substantial experience in evaluating persons 
under the influence of controlled substances. 
6. Deputy Jenkins evaluated the Defendant, determined that 
he exhibited signs of impairment and inquired as to whether he had 
recently used marijuana or other controlled substances. 
7. The Defendant avoided answering the question about drug 
use* 
8. A body fluid search warrant was obtained and a sample 
taken from the Defendant. 
9. Laboratory analysis of the sample revealed the presence 
of methamphetamine and marijuana metabolite in the Defendant's system. 
Having entered the above findings of fact, the Court 
concludes as follows: 
CCTqiMIQffg S L I M 
1. The use of narcotics is prohibited by Section 58-37-8, 
Utah Code Annotated. 
2. "Use" is defined in Section 58-37-2, Utah Code Annotated 
at subparagraph (l)(dd), and includes where "the controlled substance 
is found in a place or under circumstances indicating that the person 
had the ability and intent to exercise dominion and control over it." 
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State of Utah vs. Melvin Scott Beckstead 
3. The finding of both methamphetamine and marijuana 
metabolite in the Defendant's system, coupled with the Defendant's 
efforts to evade questions about use of drugs, is sufficient to 
conclude that the use was voluntary. 
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
DATED this ;i day of March, 2002. 
D*VfD L. 0X7I MOWER 
DISTRICT COURT 
MMMMfl CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy~of the 
above and foregoing a u i a m ORDBR was placed in the United states 
mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class.-postage thereon fully 
prepaid on the day of March, 2002, addressed as follows: 
Mr. Marcus Taylor 
Attorney at Law 
173 North Main Street 
». a. lex 782 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
l\m*w. vX^. vN- uOai 
MAILINC CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing SIQM1D ORDER was placed in the United States mail 
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at Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid on 
the
 It d aY of March, 2002, addressed as follows: 
Mr. Marcus Taylor 
Attorney at Law 
175 North Main Street 
P. 0. Box 728 
Richfield, Utah 87401 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
